Optimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruism

In this paper we study the optimal conversion policy set by society composed of a sequence of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations. We show that society cen be equivalently viewed as a sequence of hyperbolic discounting agents. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution to an intergenerational non-cooperative dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible conversion. We show that under both naive and sophisticated beliefs about future time-inconsistency, the option value attached to the conversion decision is eroded and earlier conversion accurs. This determines a drastic bias toward the current generation gratification, which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from deforestation

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Informasi Detil

Judul Seri

Journal of Forest Economics

No. Panggil

//

Penerbit

: ., 2012

Deskripsi Fisik

13 halaman

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

1104-6899

Klasifikasi

//

Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subyek

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Info Detil Spesifik

Perpustakaan RI ARDIKOESOEMA

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

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